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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., j 
Defendants and Appellants. ] 
i Appellate Court No: 20000946-CA 
1 Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority pursuant to §78-2-
2(4), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED 
(A) Did the district court err in concluding that Plaintiffs are abutting 
landowners when there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway 
to which they claim right of access by prescriptive easement? 
(B) Did the district court err in concluding that a prescriptive easement 
was created providing access to Plaintiffs property, when after the division of the 
dominant tenement, Plaintiffs property does not abut on the claimed roadway 
easement? 
(C) Did the district court err in concluding that when the dominant 
tenement is partitioned into three parcels, that Plaintiffs acquire a prescriptive 
easement for ingress to and egress from such parcels, which the road easement 
in no way is appurtenant? 
(D) Did the district court err in concluding that when Plaintiff acquires a 
50 by 60-foot strip of land as an undivided one-half interest with another party, 
which abuts the claimed prescriptive easement; that the prescriptive easement 
will benefit this 50 by 60 foot strip of land? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review the trial court's legal determinations for correctness, granting them 
no deference. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbridge, 821 P.2d 1136, 
1137 (Utah 1991). Questions of law are reviewed under the correctness 
standard. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were served with a complaint in 1996 in which Plaintiffs 
claimed a prescriptive roadway easement as well as a 60-foot deeded roadway 
easement on the westerly 60 feet of defendants' residential property. 
On July 10,1998, pursuant to the parties respective motion's for Partial 
Summary Judgments, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, granted Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the defendants, in which the 
court found that the claimed 60-foot deeded roadway easement on the westerly 
60 feet of defendants' residential property was a legal nullity, this judgment which 
is now final, was filed December 23, 1998, (See Exhibit "A" attached) and has not 
been appealed by any of the parties. 
On July 17, 1998, Garkane Power Association, Inc., which owns the real 
property, which abuts the defendants' residential lot, disclaims any interest in the 
defendants' property. (See Exhibit "B" attached) 
On July 20, 1998, a bench trial was held, the Honorable K. L. Mclff, the 
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge presiding. A Judgment was entered in the 
above-entitled matter on November 1, 1999. (See Exhibit "C" attached) 
Both parties filed Motions for New Trials, which were denied on December 
20, 1999, and the Order was filed on October 2, 2000. (See Exhibit "D" attached) 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Honorable K. L. Mclff, Sixth 
Judicial District Court, Kane County, Kanab Department, State of Utah, rendered 
on November 1, 1999. (See Exhibit "E" attached) 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1987, ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., (Appellee), 
acquired real property, which is approximately 30 acres (Alvey property is 
identified as K-19-8 ANNEX on Exhibit "F" attached) from Garkane Power 
Association by deed. (See Exhibit "G" attached) Garkane Power Association 
retained approximately 20 acres (See Exhibit "F" attached), (Garkane property is 
identified as K-19-9 ANNEX on exhibit). The Mackelprang (Appellant) property is 
identified as lot "32" on said exhibit. 
In 1996 Alvey filed a complaint against Mackelprang claiming a prescriptive 
easement over the Mackelprang property (lot "32") for ingress to and egress from 
the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX). From 1987 when Alvey purchased his 
property to the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut 
the Mackelprang property lot "32". 
In 1997, Alvey received a Quit Claim deed from Garkane (See Exhibit "H" 
attached) which conveyed to Alvey an undivided one-half interest in that portion 
of Garkane property covering the entire westerly 60-foot wide portion of the 50-
foot strip. This conveyance resulted in a third parcel being created, which is 60 
by 50 feet in size which abuts the Mackelprang property. 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to the 
present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the Mackelprang 
property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached) In Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc.. 24 
Utah 2d 199, 468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1970), the court stated the following, 'In 
defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. p. 406 relates the following: "It 
has been said that it conveys the idea of bordering on, bounded by, with 
nothing intervening. Plaintiffs have suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs 
are not abutting owners since there is a strip of land between their property and 
the roadway to which they claim right of access."' [emphasis added] 
Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure 
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the 
way". See Wood v. Ashbv. 122 Utah 580, 253 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952). 
The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on November 1, 
1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached) does not Find or Decree that the prescriptive 
roadway easement is for the use and benefit of the third parcel being created, 
(See Exhibit "H" attached). In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half 
interest in this third parcel has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang 
property. (See Exhibit "B" attached) 
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the 
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey 
property. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE 
ENTITLED TO A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT BENEFITING A PARCEL OF 
LAND, WHICH DOES NOT ABUT THE ROADWAY TO WHICH THEY CLAIM 
RIGHT OF ACCESS, BY PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT? 
A. When Garkane deeds to Alvey a 50 by 60-foot strip of land which abuts 
the claimed prescriptive easement as an undivided one-half interest with 
Garkane, this does not change the fact that Alveys' property does not abut 
Mackelprangs' lot "32". 
In, Mawsonv. J.G. Inv. Co.. 23 Utah 2d 437, 464 P.2d 595, 595 (Utah 
1970), the Utah Supreme Court in an appeal from a judgment in an action where 
the plaintiff sought removal of a fence erected by defendant on the boundary of a 
parcel deeded and used as a roadway held the following: 
The findings of the trial court, supported by the record, show that 
plaintiff acquired three lots alongside the roadway, together with 1/5 
of the latter, all of which had been deeded to plaintiffs predecessor, 
then to plaintiff, the 1/5 interest "to be used as a roadway." This 
roadway abutted a number of lots to the North and South, and 
obviously the conveyances of fractional interests thereof to abutting 
lot owners was intended to be used and was used only for ingress 
and egress to such lots. They were conveyances of roadway rights, 
not fee rights, sort of in the nature of dominant estates to which the 
fee, including underground rights, - in minerals, for example, - was 
servient. Plaintiffs right to use the roadway was for such purpose of 
ingress to and egress from any property which he owned along the 
roadway. Hence his claim in this action that because he had 
acquired land to the East and beyond the described roadway, 
he could use such easement for ingress to and egress from 
such land to which the road in no way, conveyance-wise or 
otherwise, was appurtenant, must fail.' [emphasis added] 
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the 
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on 
November 1, 1999, (See Exhibit "C" attached) does not Find or Decree that the 
prescriptive roadway easement is for the use and benefit of the third parcel being 
created. (See Exhibit "H" attached). See Judgment in exhibit "C" pg. 2, Findings 
of Fact, par. 1, which states the legal description of the Alvey property, pg. 14, 
Conclusion of Law, par. 9 and pg. 16, Order. Judgment, and Decree, par. 1. In 
the above stated Judgment the findings, conclusions and decree only find and 
order that the easement on lot "32" is for the use and benefit of the Alvey property 
which does not abut the Mackelprang property. 
In fact Garkane which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel 
has disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. (See Exhibit "B" 
attached) 
Since it is undisputed that the Alvey property does not abut the 
Mackelprang property a prescriptive roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey 
property. 
B. Plaintiffs cannot acquire a prescriptive easement when they are not 
abutting landowners. 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to 
the present time, the Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) does not abut the 
Mackelprang property lot "32". (See Exhibit "F" attached) The Utah Supreme 
Court, in Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc., 24 Utah 2d 199, 468 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 
1970), stated the following: 
'Defendant contends that plaintiffs have not been deprived of any property 
right because they never had such a right. We must agree with this 
contention as to the rights asserted by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' property is not 
contiguous at any point with the old roadway. There is a distance of 10 
feet to 14 feet between plaintiffs' north property line and the south edge of 
the roadway. In defining "abut" Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. p. 406 
relates the following: "It has been said that it conveys the idea of 
bordering on, bounded by, with nothing intervening. Plaintiffs have 
suggested nothing to the contrary. Plaintiffs are not abutting owners since 
there is a strip of land between their property and the roadway to which 
they claim right of access. The old roadway was created by prescriptive 
use and cannot otherwise be defined except by survey of the old oiled 
surface. Such a survey has been conducted and drawn up by the Salt 
Lake County Surveyor's office. A copy of the drawing has been entered 
into evidence as exhibit D-9 and shows the strip of land referred to above. 
The drawing and plaintiff Farnsworth's testimony reveal this strip of land 
to be sufficiently wide to force the conclusion that the roadway was 
entirely to the north of plaintiffs' property and that plaintiffs can in no 
way claim to be abutting owners. No other conclusion is possible upon 
the fact of this case. Since plaintiffs' sole theory on appeal rests on the 
rights of an abutting owner, this appeal must fail.' [emphasis added] 
This case is very similar to the facts in Farnsworth, were the Alvey property 
(K-19-9 ANNEX) is 50 feet north of the Mackelprang property (lot "32"). The gate 
were Alvey claims access to the Mackelprang Property is entirely to the south of 
the Alvey property by 50 feet. The Alvey property (K-19-9 ANNEX) can in know 
way claim to be abutting property owners to the Mackelprang lot "32". 
C. A prescriptive easement could not be created providing access to 
plaintiffs' property, when after the division of the dominant tenement, 
plaintiffs' property does not abut on the claimed roadway easement. 
Utah case law is clear that "an easement of way does not insure 
to the benefit of the owner of a parcel which after the division does not abut on the 
way". The Utah Supreme Court found in, Wood v. Ashbv, 122 Utah 580, 253 
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), the following: 
'It is true, as stated by appellant, that a right of way appurtenant to an 
estate is appurtenant to every part of it and inures to the benefit of the 
owners of every part. 'Nevertheless, the partition of the dominant tenement 
cannot create a further or additional easement across a servient tenement, 
and an easement of way does not inure to the benefit of the owner of 
a parcel which after the division does not abut on the way; and where 
the resulting use will increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right 
to the easement will be extinguished.' 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 65(b), p. 
732.' [emphasis added] 
The facts of this case are similar to Wood, when Alvey purchased his 
property in 1987 and Garkane partitioned the dominant tenement, Alveys' parcel 
did not abut Mackelprangs' lot "32" after the division and therefore Alvey is not 
entitled to an easement from lot "32". 
CONCLUSION 
Alvey is not entitled to a prescriptive easement from lot "32" to access the 
50 by 60 foot lot. The Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter filed on 
November 1,1999 does not Find or Decree that the prescriptive roadway 
easement is for the use and benefit of the third parcel being created. In fact 
Garkane, which has an undivided one-half interest in this third parcel, has 
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disclaimed any interest in the Mackelprang property. 
It is undisputed that from 1987 when Alvey purchased his property to 
the present time, the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property. 
Utah case law is clear that an easement of way does not benefit the owner of a 
parcel which after the division does not abut on the way. Since it is undisputed 
that the Alvey property does not abut the Mackelprang property a prescriptive 
roadway easement cannot benefit the Alvey property. 
Therefore, the defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
district court's judgment quieting title to a prescriptive easement on the 
Mackelprang property for the benefit of the Alvey property. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 2001 
Van Mackelprang, Pro se^ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendants-Appellants was personally hand delivered on the p £ day of 
February, 2001, to: Colin R. Winchester Esq., 34 North Main St., Kanab, UT. 
84741. -) 
Van Mackelprang 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the o ^ d a y of February, 2001,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, the original and seven (7) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendants-Appellants to: Clerk of the Court, Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South 
State, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, UT 84114^0230. 
Van Mackelprang 
ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A 
VAN MACKELPRANG (5996) 
MICHAEL W.PARK (2516) 
THE PARK FIRM, P.C. 
376 E. Sunland Dr., #1 
P.O. Box 2438 
St. George, UT 84771 
Telephone: (435) 673-8689 
FILED 
KANE COHMTv 
DEC 2 3 1998 
FILED 
KAMF CO! 'MTV 
D 
Clerk 
a 
ClerK 
SIXTH DISTRICT C O U ^ T H DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
KANAB CREEK RANCHOS, INC., 
AndJOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendant(s). 
VAN AND JAMIE RAE MACKELPRANG, 
Counter-Claimant(s), 
vs. 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Counter-Claim Defendant(s). 
ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Judge K.L. Mclff 
Case No. 960600070 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on July 10, 1998, pursuant to the 
parties respective Motion's for Partial Summary Judgements, the Honorable K.L. Mclff, 
District Court Judge, presiding. The Cross-Claimant Jamie Mackelprang was not present 
but was represented personally by attorney Van Mackelprang and Plaintiff LaDell Alvey 
was present personally and was represented by attorney Todd Macfarlane. The court, 
heard statements, and argument(s) from counsel. The Court, being fully advised in the 
premises, having considered pending motions, statements and arguments of counsel, and 
for good cause shown, hereby finds that the following are undisputed facts: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court Finds that the undisputed evidence is that the attempted 
reservation of the of the sixty (60) foot easement arose from the conveyance of lot 32, 
subsequent to the plating and subdivision effort. That at the time of the attempted 
reservation the grantors who attempted to reserve the sixty (60) foot easement did not 
have an ownership interest in the land to the North or the property referred to as the 
"Jameson " property. The Court finds that the attempted reservation of said easement 
was not for the benefit of the land North or the subdivision and that in either event it 
could have been shown on the plat map. The Court finds that it was created solely for 
the benefit of creating a situation which would give Clarkson and Snelgrove a position 
of leverage in the property to the North and which could not be utilized by anyone but 
said defendants and the legal effect of the attempted reservation is null and void. It did 
not create an appurtenant easement, nor did it create an easement in gross, because it 
had nothing to attach and could not be utilized in any meaningful way. The only 
meaningful way it could be utilized was by acquiring the property northward, which said 
defendants did not own and still do not own. 
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/nrJy 
ORDER AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court concludes that said reservation 
did not create an easement or right and that the Quit-claim deed to Alvey in 1996, 
passed no right. The Court Concludes that it was not possible for defendants to elevate 
the easement to a higher level than when they attempted to created it. 
Due to the fact that the Court has concluded that the attempted reserved 
easement is a legal nullity, the Court does not need reach a legal conclusion in 
response to the protective covenants. The Court will not resolve all the issues 
concerning the restrictive covenants and considers those issues still open and does not 
need to resolve them, because of the way the court has ruled on the sixty (60) foot 
claim of reservation. 
DATED this day of December, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
K.L. 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT: 
\jl^(MjM^ 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Attorney for Alvey Development Corp. 
VAN MACKELPRANG 
Attorney for Litigants Mackelprang 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
MARCUS TAYLOR (3203) 
ATTORNEY FOR GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
175 NORTH MAIN STREET 
P.O. BOX 728 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
(801) 896-6484 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., * 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
VAN MACKELPRANG, JAMIE RAE 
MACKELPRANG, KANAB CREEK 
RANCHOS, INC., and JOHN DOES 1-10, * 
Defendants. * 
DISCLAIMER OF INTEREST IN 
REAL PROPERTY AND MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL 
CONSOLIDATED CASE NOS. 
960600070 
960600040 
VAN MACKELPRANG, JAMIE RAE 
MACKELPRANG, 
Counter-claimants, 
JUDGE K. L. McIFF 
vs. 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Counter-Defendant. 
COMES NOW Garkane Power Association, Inc. (Garkane), by its attorney, 
Marcus Taylor, and hereby submits the following disclaimer of interest and motion for 
dismissal: 
Disclaimer of Interest in Real Property and Motion for Dismissal 
Alvey v. Mackelprang et al. 
Page - 2 -
1. Garkane disclaims any interest in the real property at issue in these two 
cases. 
2. In light of said disclaimer, Garkane requests that it be dismissed as a 
party from these two cases. 
3. Garkane is unaware of any instrument of record which reflects an interest 
on the part of Garkane in and to the subject real property, but if any party contends otherwise, 
Garkane will execute an appropriate instrument suitable for recording so as to clear the record 
title. 
DATED this / / ' day of July, 1998. 
MARCUS TAYLOR 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the / /-nA^day of July, 1998,1 sent via facsimile transmission the foregoing 
Disclaimer of Interest in Real Property and Motion for Dismissal, to: 
Todd Macfarlane Kevin DeGraw 
Kanab, Utah 84741 St. George, Utah 84771 
Via Fax: 801-644-8156 Via Fax: 801-674-0488 
Michael W. Park Van Mackelprang 
St. George, Utah 84771 328 West Kanab Creek Drive 
Via Fax: 801-673-8767 Kanab, Utah 84741 
MARCUS TAYLOR P . G 
Attorney at Law 
July 17, 1998 
Todd Macfarlane 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Via Fax: 801-644-8156 
Michael W. Park 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Via Fax: 801-673-8767 
Kevin DeGraw 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Via Fax: 801-674-0488 
Van Mackelprang 
328 West Kanab Creek Drive 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Re: Alvey Development Corp. v. Mackelprang et al. 
Gentlemen: 
As you may be aware, Garkane Power Association, Inc., purchased a parcel of real property which 
will afford it access to the existing property from the west. Given that acquisition, as well as the 
ruling of the court in granting partial summary judgment, Garkane is simply not interested in 
committing further time and resources to this litigation. Therefore, we will not participate in trial 
proceedings next week. 
I have prepared a disclaimer and motion for dismissal which will be filed. A copy of the document 
is included with this letter for each of you. Also enclosed is a copy of the proposed order of 
dismissal. If anyone opposes this approach, call me immediately. 
Respectfully yours, / 
Marcus Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
MT/sc 
Encl. 
cc: Garkane Power Association, Inc. (w/encl.) 
175 North Main Street 
P.O. Sox 728 
Diclifield, Utah 84701 
Telephone. (435) 896-6484 
Facsimile. (435) 896-8103 
e-mail, mtaylor@inquo.net 
EXHIBIT "C 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156 
'-•'-"l 7999 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE 
Case No. 960600070 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court for bench trial on July 
20, 1998, pursuant to the claims and counterclaims of the 
respective parties, Judge K. L. Mclff, District Court Judge, 
presiding. Following the trial, and after hearing testimony, 
receiving evidence, and hearing arguments from counsel, the Court 
made findings and rulings from the bench. The Court requested 
that Plaintiffs' then counsel, Todd Macfarlane, prepare written 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment Quieting 
Title. 
Mr. Macfarlane prepared a document that included findings, 
conclusions, and a judgment, and Defendants filed certain 
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objections thereto. Those objections came before the Court for 
decision on December 23, 1998. Plaintiff LaDell Alvey was 
present, and was represented by new counsel for all Plaintiffs, 
Colin R. Winchester. Defendant Van Mackelprang was present, both 
in an individual capacity, and as counsel for all Defendants. 
The Court reviewed the objections, and ordered specified changes 
to the proposed Judgment Quieting Title submitted by Mr. 
Macfarlane. Based on the foregoing, the Court now enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Alvey Development Corporation, ("Alvey 
Development"), owns property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah, 
which is more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06' West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54'44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0°09f33" East 1612 feet to beginning. 
2. Alvey Development acquired the subject property from 
Garkane Power Association by deed dated November 3, 1987. 
3. Garkane Power Association acquired the subject 
property, including the above-described Alvey parcel, as part of 
a larger 50-acre parcel from Afton Jameson, by deed dated 
November 21, 1986. 
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4. Jameson and her late husband, Karl Jameson, acquired 
the above-described parcel from Sytha Church by deed dated 
October 11, 1958. 
5. Prior to Jamesons, the subject property belonged to the 
Church family, including Jack and Sytha Church, since at least 
1939. 
6. Defendants Van and Jamie Mackelprang likewise own 
property located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah, hereafter referred 
to as the "Mackelprang Property", or "Lot 32", which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
ALL OF LOT 32, TRACT S 34, UNIT 1, KANAB CREEK RANCHOS 
SUBDIVISION, according to the official plat thereof on 
file in the office of the County Recorder of Kane 
County, State of Utah. 
7. Mackelprangs acquired their property at foreclosure 
sale, by Trustee's Deed dated February 12, 1990. 
8. Prior to Mackelprangs' acquisition of Lot 32, the 
property now constituting Lot 32 had been subdivided in 1971 by 
Kanab Creek Ranchos, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "KCR") a 
corporate developer whose primary principals include Dale 
Clarkson and Philip Snelgrove. 
9. KCR acquired the subject property, including what is 
now Lot 32, from Kenyon and Anna May Little, by deed dated July 
23, 1970, as part of a larger 10-acre parcel. 
10. Littles acquired the subject 10-acre parcel from Mrs. 
Little's father, Clair Ford, by deed dated August 5, 1964. 
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11. Although the "Little/Ford" property had been owned by 
Clair Ford's father, John, for many years, Clair Ford acquired 
the subject property by redeeming it following Tax Sale, by Tax 
Deed dated May 31, 1957. 
12. Lot 32 is located entirely within the 10-acre parcel 
that constitutes the Little/Ford property. 
13. The subject Alvey property adjoins the subject 
Mackelprang property, as more fully shown on the survey plat 
prepared by Rosenberg & Associates dated January 24, 1997, with 
the Alvey property on the north, and Lot 32 on the south. A copy 
of such survey is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
14. The subject properties are divided by a fence running 
between, which has been in place in the same location, since at 
least 1958. 
15. The fence includes a gate between the respective 
properties, approximately 14 feet in width, which is located 
approximately 25 feet east of the northwesterly corner of Lot 32, 
as depicted in Exhibit "A". 
16. The gate has been in the same location, in the fence, 
since at least 1958, when the Alvey property was owned by the 
Jameson family, and the Mackelprang property was owned by 
Ford(s). 
17. According to the evidence presented at trial, dating 
back at least as early as the 1930s, there was an access road 
along the west side of Kanab Creek, which crossed both the Alvey 
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and Mackelprang properties, and passed through the gate in the 
fence dividing the two properties. 
18. Although such road and gate were accessible 
periodically from Kanab on the north, based on varying conditions 
of Kanab Creek, it was more readily accessible from the south, 
where there were several more reliable creek crossings, near the 
location of the present Kanab Airport. 
19. Based on the evidence presented, there has been 
continuity of historical agricultural use pre-existing either of 
the present parties, going back at least as early as 1939, but 
the primary evidence of such use focused more on the time period 
since 1958. 
20. Since at least 1939, however, when the Church family 
owned the subject Alvey property, continuing through 1958 when 
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property, and throughout the 
duration of their ownership, the subject Alvey property was 
historically used for agricultural purposes. 
21. Although the precise nature of such agriculture use(s), 
including livestock numbers, densities, etc., are not entirely 
clear based on the evidence presented, such use(s) included 
livestock numbers and densities of up to five horses and ten 
cows, but often averaged less that that, with an average of three 
horses and three cows. 
22. Alveys1 predecessors in interest, including Jamesons, 
utilized the access across Lot 32 to the Alvey/Jameson property, 
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particularly for vehicular access, to tend and care for their 
livestock, and engage in agricultural use(s) of the property. 
23. Although it is not possible, based on the evidence 
presented, to precisely define the exact extent of the use of the 
access across what is now Lot 32, it was used when necessary or 
desired by the subject owners, as dictated by their agricultural 
needs. In other words, they used the access easement when 
necessary or desirable to tend, care for and use their horses and 
livestock. Such use was regular and constant in the sense that 
livestock were usually on the property. It was sporadic in the 
sense that livestock were not always there, and did not always 
require exactly the same level of attention, use, or care. In 
addition, not only were livestock kept, and cared for there, but 
they were also used on the subject property, for agricultural 
purposes, which included recreational horses riding on the 
subject and surrounding property. 
24. There were times when such use(s) occurred on a regular 
daily basis, and other times when such use(s) occurred on a 
weekly or even monthly basis, all according to the need(s) at the 
time. 
25. Such uses continued until approximately 1985 when Mr. 
Jameson died and the Jamesons established a second residence in 
Las Vegas. 
26. By 1985, access to the Alvey property across what is 
now Lot 32 had been well established by prescriptive use for a 
period well in excess of 20 years, going back as far as 1939. 
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Such use was open, notorious, and adverse. There is no credible 
evidence that the use was ever permissive. 
27. In 1970, when what is now Lot 32 was acquired by KCR, 
the access route across the property was open, notorious, and 
apparent on the ground. It had been apparent on the ground for 
many years prior to that, dating back to at least 1958 when 
Jamesons acquired the subject Alvey property. 
28. The Kanab Creek Ranchos Subdivision was platted in 
approximately 1971. 
29. Sometime after the subdivision was platted and 
recorded, KCR principals became aware that the access they 
witnessed and observed on the ground was apparently the only 
reasonable vehicular access to the Jameson property. 
Consequently, when KCR sold Lot 32 in 1977, it undertook or 
attempted to reserve a 60-foot roadway access easement across the 
westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, in apparent recognition of the prior 
existence of the subject access easement, and based on a 
purported desire to provide better access to such property if 
they should ever acquire it, and/or provide for better access 
planning in the general area. 
30. Consequently, the original conveyance of Lot 32 to its 
original owners, Weavers, in 1977, included reference to the 
subject 60-foot roadway easement. 
31. KCR did not attempt to create the easement for the 
specific benefit of Jamesons, or the Jameson Property. It did so 
because»KCR principals contemplated the possibility of eventually 
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acquiring the Jameson property and because they considered such 
access to be consistent with an effort to enhance general 
planning for access in the general area. 
32. KCR's attempted reference to and/or attempted creation 
of a broader easement, however, did not constitute any form of 
permission to use the pre-existing prescriptive easement. 
33. From that time forward, Jamesons had a consciousness of 
both sources (i.e., the attempted express easement as well as the 
pre-existing prescriptive easement), as a basis for possible 
access to their property, and attempted to broaden their 
prescriptive access right(s) by attempting to use and take 
advantage of the purported express easement, reflected in the 
recorded Weaver deed, Consequently, they notified Weaver's 
successor in interest, the Smiths, that they were relying on the 
purported 60-foot easement, for access to the property, and that 
they claimed a right to use and rely upon the express 60-foot 
easement referred to in the Weaver Deed. 
34. Despite such assertion(s), however, Jamesons did not 
broaden or increase their actual use of the easement. 
35. In 1986, after Garkane acquired the Jamesons' property, 
Garkane designed and built an electrical power transmission line 
across the easterly portion of the Jameson property, continuing 
to utilize the established access easement across Lot 32, as 
necessary for access to their property. Because of the price 
Jameson was asking for the property at the time, which Garkane 
found unacceptable, LaDell Alvey who was acting as an independent 
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contractor for Garkane at the time, negotiated an arrangement 
with Garkane whereby he would purchase any remaining portion of 
the subject Jameson property which Garkane did not need. Garkane 
made that determination in 1987, and deeded the balance of the 
subject property, including approximately 30 acres, to Alvey 
Development. 
36. In the process of deeding and conveying the subject 
property to Alvey, Garkane retained a strip along the north side 
of the Jameson property and a strip along the south side, to 
provide access to its own property across the remaining Alvey 
property. The strip along the south side was designed to reach 
and include the 60-foot access easement, across Lot 32, which 
Garkane considered at the time to be a valid access easement. 
37. Although there is some discrepancy between the plat 
Garkane relied upon at the time of its effort to convey the 
subject property to Alveys and the later survey plat prepared by 
Rosenburg & Associates, which shows the 50-foot strip running to 
the northwest corner of Lot 32 and essentially covering the 
entire width of the purported 60-foot roadway easement, any such 
discrepancy is irrelevant and immaterial because in 1997, Garkane 
conveyed to Alvey Development an undivided one-half interest in 
that portion of the Garkane property covering the entire westerly 
60-foot wide portion of the 50-foot strip, which resulted in 
undisputavle physical abutment between the prescriptive easement 
and the Alvey property. 
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38. Such conveyance was in accordance with the 
understanding and intention of the parties at the time, Alvey and 
Garkane, who intended that they would both have good and 
sufficient access to their respective properties, across Lot 32, 
from Kanab Creek Drive. 
39. The gate and the fence between the subject properties, 
have been in place throughout the entire history evidenced in 
this case, at least since 1958 and continuing up to the present. 
Although sometimes the gate was closed and sometimes it was open, 
the gate always remained in the same location and provided access 
to the subject Alvey property. 
40. Although there may have been some slight deviation in 
the exact route of the access or approach across Lot 32 to the 
gate, for at least 20 years, such access has been located within 
the westerly-most 60-feet of what is now Lot 32, always merging 
at the gate between the respective properties. 
41. At all times from at least 1958, the use was adverse 
and was not permissive. 
42. After Garkane acquired the subject Alvey property in 
1986, and Alvey acquired the same in 1987, they continued to use 
the subject access easement openly, notoriously, and adversely, 
because any previous attempt to create an express easement across 
the westerly 60-feet across the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32 was 
legally ineffectual and invalid. 
43. Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32 in 1990, when Van 
Mackelprang was in law school. 
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44. Based on its obvious appearance on the ground, and 
reference to an easement in the previous chain of title to Lot 
32, Mackelprangs had constructive notice and either knew or 
should have known that there was at least a possibility of an 
easement across the property. 
45. Although Mackelprangs subsequently researched issues 
regarding the attempted creation of the express 60 foot roadway 
easement, and determined that, in their opinion, it did not 
create a valid easement, their conclusions did not affect the 
prescriptive easement, and any use thereof following 
Mackelprangs' acquisition of Lot 32 was likewise non-permissive. 
46. Although Mackelprangs may not have observed any use of 
the subject access easement after they acquired Lot 32, there has 
been some use since their acquisition. Such uses continued in 
the early 1990s, after Mackelprangs acquired Lot 32, but ended in 
approximately 1994 when the Mackelprang improvements on Lot 3 2 
became such that it was no longer possible to continue to use the 
subject easement without damaging such improvements. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant(s) Mackelprangs' property, Lot 32, Kanab Creek 
Ranchos Subdivision, as more fully described herein is subject to 
a valid, legally enforceable prescriptive easement, located 
within the westerly 60 feet of such property, established by 
open, notorious, and adverse use of the subject easement by Alvey 
Development and its predecessors, for the use and benefit of the 
adjoining Alvey property, as more fully described herein, for a 
period in excess of 20 years, for agricultural purposes. 
2. Any subsequent change of use(s) of the subject property, 
by Garkane or Alvey, have been of such short duration that they 
have not affected or changed the nature of the historical use of 
the subject prescriptive easement. 
3. Although the prescriptive easement at issue is separate 
and distinct from any purported attempt to create or reserve any 
broader express access easement across the westerly 60 feet of 
Lot 32, KCR's attempt to create or convey a valid 60 foot roadway 
easement was legally ineffectual. Although such reference may in 
fact constitute an easement in gross, belonging to KCR, and/or 
its principals, which is not appurtenant to any other property, 
as a personal easement in gross, it cannot be alienated, 
assigned, or conveyed to any other party. 
4. Although it is not possible to define the precise 
location and route of the subject prescriptive easement, any such 
inability has.resulted from Mackelprangs' actions and 
12 
improvements, which have obliterated present signs of the precise 
location and route of the subject easement. Consequently, 
Mackelprangs should be estopped from complaining of the exact, 
precise location within the 60-feet, because it was their own 
acts, placement and improvements in landscaping, etc., that have 
obliterated physical signs of the easement and its precise route. 
5. Likewise, because of Mackelprangs' conclusion that the 
express easement was invalid, they should also be estopped from 
claiming that any continued use of the easement after they 
acquired the subject property was not adverse. 
6. Any lapse of time since 1994, the last actual use of the 
prescriptive easement, and December 5, 1996, the date of filing 
of this action, has been insufficient to extinguish the 
prescriptive rights of Alvey Development, because there has not 
been any intentional abandonment by Alvey Development. 
7. On the other hand, there has been an intentional 
abandonment of such rights by Garkane Power Association, by 
virtue of documents it filed with the Court expressly disclaiming 
and abandoning any further right or interest to use the subject 
property (Lot 32) for access to the Garkane property. 
8. Despite such abandonment by Garkane, however, the Alvey 
and Garkane uses of the subject prescriptive easement are 
separate and independent, and Garkane's abandonment in no way 
affects Alveys' continued legal right to continue to use and rely 
upon the prescriptive easement across Lot 32. 
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9. Consequently, Alvey Development is entitled to a decree 
recognizing and quieting title to a valid and legally enforceable 
prescriptive easement for the benefit of the following described 
property: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06f West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54'44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0°09,33'f East 1612 feet to beginning. 
10. Such easement is located within the westerly 60 feet of 
Lot 32. If such easement remains unfenced, its width should be 
ten feet. If the easement is fenced, the access lane created by 
such fence, if any, should be one rod (i.e., 16.5 feet) in width. 
The decision as to whether to fence the easement shall be made by 
the Mackelprangs. 
11. Although the Mackelprangs should be entitled to define 
the exact location of the easement within the westerly 60-feet of 
Lot 32, they should not do so in such a way that does not provide 
a reasonably straight access and approach to the gate located 
between the respective properties, but otherwise may relocate the 
easement anywhere within the westerly 60-feet with sufficient 
adjustments for widths and allowances for turns, etc., such that 
it may be fully utilized consistent with its historic use(s) 
through the subject gate. 
12. Said prescriptive easement may be used to serve the 
agricultural purposes of the subject Alvey property, which shall 
be limited to the nature, scope and extent of historic use, as 
reasonably necessary to care for not more than five horses nor 
ten head of cattle, with an average of three horses and three 
cows, but includes every use that is reasonably necessary or 
required to care for, feed, water, use and utilize such livestock 
on the subject property, including vehicular transportation to 
and from such property. This statement of limitation should in 
no way limit the nature and use of the Alvey property, but only 
serves to define limitations on the use of the prescriptive 
easement across Lot 32 which provides access to such property. 
13. Alvey Development should also be entitled to maintain 
and conduct such reasonable improvements, including but not 
limited to grading, drainage, and maintenance of the driving 
surface, as may be necessary for reasonable continued use and 
utilization of the subject access easement for the defined 
historical uses. 
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ORDER, JUDGMENT, AND DEGREE 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff Alvey Development Corporation is hereby 
awarded judgment in the form of a decree quieting title to a 
valid, and fully enforceable prescriptive easement 10-feet in 
width, or up to 16.5 feet in feet in width if the subject 
easement is fenced at the election of the Mackelprangs, located 
within the westerly 60-feet of Lot 32, Kanab Creek Ranchos 
Subdivision according to the official plat thereof, for the use 
and benefit of the following described property: 
BEGINNING at a point 327.81 feet North and 0.91 feet 
West of the quarter Section Corner common to Section 32 
and 33, Township 43 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
& Meridian; which point lies on the section line 
between said section, and running thence East 255.39 
feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; thence East 
576.04 feet; thence North 0°06' West 1577.9 feet; 
thence North 88°54?44" West 832.86 feet; thence South 
0«09f33" East 1612 feet to beginning. 
2. The subject easement shall be appurtenant to and run 
with the subject properties, with Lot 32 fully subject to the 
prescriptive easement, as the "servient estate", for the benefit 
of the above-described Alvey Property, which is the "dominant 
estate" . 
3. Use of such easement shall be limited to the historical 
nature, extent, burden and scope of use as more fully described 
above, together with any reasonable, necessary efforts to improve 
and/or maintain the surface to facilitate the utilization 
thereof. * 
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4. Subject to the uses and parameters set forth above, 
Defendants Mackelprang shall not do anything to thwart, 
interfere, or inhibit Plaintiff Alveys' use and utilization of 
the subject easement for the stated purposes. 
DATED t h i is %&_ day of J 'jfob&BZ _ , 1 999 
BY THE COURT: 
K. L. M 
Distric 
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
34 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-8156 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., 
) ORDER DENYING MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, ) FOR NEW TRIAL 
v. ) 
) Case No. 960600070 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., ) 
) ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
Defendants. ) 
This matter came before the Court on December 20, 1999, 
pursuant to Plaintiff's motion for a new trial and Defendants' 
motion for a new trial. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, 
Colin R. Winchester. Defendants were represented by counsel, Van 
Mackelprang. The parties argued their respective positions. The 
Court had read the parties' various memoranda, heard the parties' 
arguments, and was fully advised in the premises. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
»**L SO 
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1. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, based on alleged 
inconsistencies in the two sets of Findings of Fact, is denied. 
The easement is neither a personal easement in gross nor a 
commercial easement in gross. Any inconsistency in the two sets 
of Findings of Fact on that issue is governed by this Order. 
2. Defendants' motion for a new trial, based on 
irregularity in the proceedings and newly discovered evidence, is 
denied. The testimony contained in the affidavits submitted is 
not substantial enough to create a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result if a new trial were granted. 
DATED t ^9 
his C~—/ 
day of ££r , 2000 
BY THE COURT: 
K. L. McTfF 
District Court Judge 
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EXHIBIT "E 
VAN MACKELPRANG Pro se 
328 W. Kanab Creek Dr. -.. fy * 
Kanab, UT 84741
 Q ° 
Telephone: (435) 644-8816 > > . . L'T2 S
'^.M !o°° 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR c o ^ X 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VAN MACKELPRANG, et. al., 
Defendant(s). 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 960600070 
Judge K.L. Mclff 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Defendant(s), appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the Judgment entered in the above-entitled matter on November 1, 1999 and 
the Order Denying New Trial entered in the above-entitled matter on October 2, 2000 
DATED this 0^. day of October, 2000. 
Van 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 Mackelprang ^ $ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document 
was mailed, by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on the SL(^ day of October, 2000, 
to: Colin R. Winchester Esq., 34 North Main St., Kanab, UT. 84741. 
Van Mackelprang 
EXHIBIT "F 
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When recorded, mail to: 
Alvey Development Corp. 
P.O.'Box417 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC, Grantor, in exchange for good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged. 
hereby QUITCLAIMS to ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORP., whose address is P.O. Box 
417, Kanab, Utah 84741, Grantee, an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the following 
described real property situate in Kane County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point 327.81 feet North and 255.39 feet East of the 
Quarter Section Corner common to Sections 32 and 33, Township 43 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0°06? 
West 50 feet; thence East 60 feet; thence South 50 feet; thence West 
60 feet, to the point of beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said GRANTOR this ^ P ^ d a v of May, 1997. 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
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By: Carl R. Albrecht " 
Its: General Manager 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
On the /^JAcLday of May, 1997, personally appeared before me Carl R. 
Albrecht, the signer of the foregoing Quitclaim Deed, of behalf of Garkane Power 
Association Inc., with authority, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
*as 
&4 
SHELUR. CURTIS 
NCTMYPV8UC > STAT? * WW 
175N.UAJNBGX7M 
RtCHRELD, UTAH 14701 
COMM. EXP. 10-7-2000 
EXHIBIT "H 
WARRANTY DEED 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., an electric 
transmitting utility with principal place of business at 56 East 
Center, Richfield, County of Sevier, State of Utah, GRANTOR, 
hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to ALVEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation with principal place of business at Kanab, County 
of Kane, State of Utah, GRANTEE, for the sum of TEN ($10.00) 
DOLLARS and other good, valuable and adequate considerations, the 
following described real property situated in Katie County, State 
of Utah: 
t 
V? 
s 
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I 
Beginning at a point 327.81 feet North and ^*i o * 
0.91 feet West of the quarter Section Corner jjj w ^ j 
common to Section 32 and 33, Township A3 z 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian? which point lies on the section line 
between said section and running thence East 
255.39 feet; thence North 0°06' West 50 feet; 
thence East 576.04 feet; thence North 0°06' 
West 1577.9 feet; thence North 88054'44n West 
832.86 feet; thence South 0°a9'33M East 1612 
feet to beginning. 
UJ 
o 
&4 
aJ 
RESERVING TO GRANTOR a permanent Easement c]J 
across the tract above-described for access to « N * 
the property retained by GRANTOR in the West SQH g 
Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 8 1° 
33 which Easement shall be effective if, and 8 % A 
only if, GRANTOR has either no access or 
insufficient access to the following described' 
tract: 
Hi 
Beginning 327.81 feet North and 255.39 
feet East of the Quarter Section Corner ^I^R} 
common to Section 32 and 33; Township A3 ^f 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian? thence North 0°06' West 50 
feet? thence Ea^ st 576.04 feet; thence i 5 2 
North 0°06' West 1577.9 feet; thence Com 
- 2 -
South 8 8 ° 5 V W West 832.86 feet; thence 
North 30 feet; thence North 88°54,44M 
East 1312.52 feet; thence South 0°09'28M 
East 1666.92 feet; thence West 1057.05 
feet to point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO any fence lines or boundary 
disputes or encroachments, technical errors or 
failure of closing or closure in descriptions 
or any easements, rights of way or other 
visible encroachments. 
SUBJECT TO all existing easements for utility 
lines including all above ground and 
underground pipelines, service outlets and 
controls and electrical transmission lines, 
ditches and canals and all zoning ordinances 
and restrictions. 
The officers who sign this Deed hereby certify that this 
Deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under 
a resolution duly adopted by the Board of Directors of the GRANTOR 
at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate 
name and seal to be hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers 
this y ' day of November, 1987. 
GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
(SEAL) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* s s 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
0 n
 the ^y ' ' day of November, 1987, personally 
appeared before me F. LEE BISTLINE and JOE JUDD, who being by me 
- 3 -
duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said F. LEE 
BISTLINE is the President, and he, the said JOE JUDD is the 
Secretary of GARKANE POWER ASSOCIATION, INC., and that the within 
and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation 
by authority of a Resolution of its Board of Directors and said F. 
LEE BISTLINE and JOE JUDD each duly acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is the 
seal of said corporation. 
Residing At: Richfield, Utah 
My Commission Expires: p* ]/+/ /*??/ 
^ R o t a r y Public -^ *.MY.io .'; / 
- .',, • >- -v. s \ h : 0 
S^7uvb *• 
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